India's 'Neighbourhood First' Policy: A Fresh Opportunity to Revitalize Regional Engagement

The BJP’s rise in West Bengal and consolidation in Assam presents a rare political opportunity to revitalise India’s engagement with its eastern neighbourhood. At the same time, leadership transitions in Dhaka and Kathmandu offer Prime Minister Narendra Modi a chance to revisit India’s regional policy. For the first time in years, the political geography within India and across its eastern periphery are in alignment with an ambitious regional agenda. Elections have political consequences; when they occur in border states, they also have foreign policy implications. Divergences between the Centre and border states have long complicated India’s neighbourhood policy. Nowhere has this been more evident than in West Bengal, Assam, and Tamil Nadu , where local political calculations have often clashed with national foreign policy priorities. Over time, regional leaders in bordering states have often become diplomatic spoilers, with an effective veto over Delhi ’s external engagement with neighbouring countries. On the face of it, the alignment of political power between the Centre and key states creates the means for better coordination of local and national interests. Yet the problem is not merely political; it is rooted in geography. Unlike relations with distant powers, diplomacy with neighbours directly affects people in the borderlands. That local and national perceptions diverge is not unnatural. Managing this tension requires sustained political tending of borderlands on Delhi’s part and a deeper accommodation of state-level concerns within national strategy. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government struggled with serious internal contradictions. Between 2004 and 2014, a divided Congress found it difficult to seize international opportunities. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, for instance, faced intense domestic opposition, including in his own party and coalition, over the civil nuclear agreement with the United States. So much so that he was forced to win an unprecedented confidence vote in Parliament on a foreign policy issue. Neighbourhood diplomacy was no less contested. In Tamil Nadu, state Congress leaders constrained Delhi’s engagement with Sri Lanka over electoral considerations. In West Bengal, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee emerged as a decisive constraint on India’s eastern diplomacy. Politics in Assam has long complicated ties with Bangladesh. During his second term, Manmohan Singh attempted an ambitious reset with Bangladesh in partnership with Sheikh Hasina . The agenda was comprehensive: settling the land boundary, addressing security concerns such as terrorism, resolving water-sharing disputes, expanding trade, and restoring pre-Partition connectivity. This effort, however, faltered at a critical moment. During Singh’s visit to Dhaka in September 2011, the proposed agreement on sharing the Teesta waters could not be inked thanks to the last-minute withdrawal of Banerjee’s political consent. This was despite the fact that the West Bengal government had been closely involved in the talks over Teesta. Yet, there was no escaping the fact Mamata’s whims sharply curtailed Delhi’s diplomatic options with one of India’s most important neighbours. The UPA government also faced resistance from the BJP on ratifying the Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) with Bangladesh. For a time, it appeared that domestic political divisions would indefinitely delay a historic settlement on long-contested post-partition boundaries. This impasse was broken after Narendra Modi became prime minister in 2014. Overruling earlier opposition within the BJP, Modi declared that a settled boundary with Bangladesh is in India’s national interest and pushed through the ratification and implementation of the LBA. He also accepted the international arbitration award on the maritime boundary with Bangladesh. These steps helped inaugurate what Modi himself described as a “golden chapter” in India-Bangladesh relations. The extraordinary momentum in bilateral relations after 2014 was disrupted by Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in 2024. The interim government led by Muhammad Yunus signalled significant departure from the direction of travel in the previous decade. However, the new leadership under Tarique Rahman has signaled a clear desire to restore positive engagement with India. Parallel to bilateral efforts, Modi sought to advance sub-regional cooperation with Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal after the failure of the SAARC summit in 2014. Today, the BJP’s surge in the north east and the emergence of new leaders in Dhaka and Kathmandu provides the basis for a fresh effort at sub-regionalism. Yet the burden of rebuilding regional cooperation cannot rest on Delhi alone. The new governments in Dhaka and Kathmandu must also be prepared to rethink regionalism in the eastern subcontinent. Even before the recent electoral outcomes, Delhi had begun signalling its intent to reinvigorate neighbourhood policy. At a recent conclave of Indian envoys, Modi reaffirmed the importance of the “Neighbourhood First” policy, with a sharper emphasis on trade and connectivity. The challenges, however, remain formidable. Issues such as migration, demographic changes, cross-border crime and terrorism, trade barriers, and river water sharing involve complex negotiations — not only between India and its neighbours, but also between the Centre and the states. These are not easily resolved through political coherence alone. But the broader regional vision that Modi articulated over the past decade remains relevant. With domestic political constraints easing and tentative openings emerging in the region, Delhi has an opportunity to advance a more coherent, sustained and productive engagement with its eastern neighbours. (C. Raja Mohan is contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express. He is also associated with the Motwani Jadeja Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University, Delhi)